Causality and Indeterminism in Human Action. Reflections on Causes and Reasons

When explaining the origin of human action, one of the thematic axes is the study of “causality” and its compatibility with indeterminism. The existence of regularities in the field of social sciences can only be explainable by acknowledging the regularities that underlie human actions. An action is the result of a decision-making process, which has a starting intention. This intentionality is what imposes on the action its regularity and at the same time its singularity. Actions reflect in their structure our rational being, which is therefore free, and also our cultural being: each action is the reflection of historical-cultural conditions that make it predictable. In the analysis of an action, all the elements that lead here to formulate an intention are “causes” of the action; the “causes” no longer exercise as such when, at least, they are dominated intellectually. In this case, the force they exert on the concrete individual decreases, so they are now considered as “reasons”.Within the current context of causality, where Woodward has an influential role, this article considers the conception of Tuomela on the formation of the social action, Salmon’s analysis of causality, and Anscombe’s characterization of intention.