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Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain

Authors :
Zhilin Wang
Qin Hu
Yawei Wang
Yinhao Xiao
Source :
High-Confidence Computing, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 100044- (2022)
Publication Year :
2022
Publisher :
Elsevier, 2022.

Abstract

The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
26672952
Volume :
2
Issue :
1
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
High-Confidence Computing
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.581bf5c311344e25aea57faed9a938ff
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2021.100044