Efficiency of a common natural forest exploitation by the system of individual transferable quotas with overlapping generations, capital, and monetary inheritance

This article focuses on the economic analysis of the exploitation of a renewable natural resource in common property, namely forests. In the Sahelian zone of West Africa with little forest cover, these natural assets are exposed to overexploitation despite the participation system established as a mode of their management for more than three decades. Thus, another mode of management is necessary to avoid the extinction of forests in certain countries like Niger to continue to benefit from the countless services that they provide. This paper proposes another mode of management by analyzing the effectiveness of the operating system through free distribution of transferable individual quotas with overlapping generations, capital, and monetary inheritance. From a general equilibrium model, the resolutions of the optimization programs using the Lagrangian show that the system in question provides the conditions for optimal management of the forest in common property. Moreover, it allows for an intergenerational transmission of renewable natural resources without any other incentive instrument such as taxes or subsidies despite the non-cooperative behavior of the actors.