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Detecting Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing Using Actuator Power Signatures
- Source :
- IEEE Access, Vol 7, Pp 133421-133432 (2019)
- Publication Year :
- 2019
- Publisher :
- IEEE, 2019.
-
Abstract
- Additive manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D printing is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. The AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks based on trusted monitoring of the current delivered to each printer motor. The proposed approach offers numerous advantages: 1) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, 2) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and 3) it can be air-gapped from the computerized components of the AM process, making simultaneous compromise more difficult. We evaluated the approach on five categories of toolpath command-level manipulations that impact the geometry of the 3D printed object. Our evaluation showed that all but one tested category of attacks can be reliably detected, even if a single toolpath command is modified.
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 21693536
- Volume :
- 7
- Database :
- Directory of Open Access Journals
- Journal :
- IEEE Access
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- edsdoj.2c59993a748948a6bbaed5c0b1df4087
- Document Type :
- article
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2928005