Policy-takers and policy calibrations: exploring the demand side of micro-level policy design choices

In the literature on policy design, the topic of citizen or policy-taker compliance, or the lack thereof, has been understood mainly in terms of economistic motivations responding to incentives and deterrents. That is, until recently. A pronounced turn toward behavioral public policy over the last two decades has diversified the set of possible propositions that are available for policy design scholars to study policy-takers. Consequently, how the diversity of policy-taker motivations and behavioral responses can be considered in the design of policy mixes and their implementation is an emerging area of study. Here, we contribute to this research effort by conceptualizing how the motivations of policy-takers affect their compliance response to the calibration of different types of policy instruments. We first elaborate on the inter-relationships between heterogenous policy-taker motivations, policy instrument calibrations, and heterogenous behavioral responses. Next, we use the example of Singapore’s approach to the management of a cyclical environmental disease (dengue) to illustrate the mix of motivations on the part of policy-takers. We then offer some thoughts on how policy instrument calibrations can be deployed to target heterogenous policy-taker motivations and induce greater policy participation.