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The Experience of Pleasure: A Perspective Between Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis

Authors :
Lorenzo Moccia
Marianna Mazza
Marco Di Nicola
Luigi Janiri
Source :
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Vol 12 (2018)
Publication Year :
2018
Publisher :
Frontiers Media S.A., 2018.

Abstract

Pleasure is more than a mere sensory event, but rather it can be conceptualized as a complex, multiform experience involving memory, motivation, homeostasis, and, sometimes, negative affects. According to Freud, affect is a perceptual modality that registers the internal drive state of the subject rather than the objective experience of the external world, and the quality of this perceptual modality is calibrated in degrees of pleasure and displeasure. Within this conceptual framework, the aim of drive is always pleasure, and objects become significant in so far as they provide a way of discharging drives pressure. Subsequent conceptual psychoanalytic developments have partially rejected such metapsychological theorizations, postulating that other intrinsic motivations that are independent from libido can be observed in humans. Intrinsic motivation broadly refers to a set of psychological concepts including the inherent propensity to pursue one’s choices, to seek out novelty and challenges, to satisfy curiosity and competence, and to extend one’s capacities and control over events. What these concepts have in common is an inner endorsement of one’s action, which is the sense that action is self-generated and is one’s own. The notions of pleasure, drives, and affects are all of utmost importance for a neuropsychoanalytic understanding of mental functioning, due to their capability to explain desire, thought, and behavior from the perspective of human subjective experience. The purpose of this paper is thus to discuss psychoanalytic conceptual developments that have addressed pleasure, drives, and affects, in the light of recent findings coming from neurosciences. In particular, we will explore for insights from Panksepp’s theory of primary-process emotional feelings, including the notion of “wanting” and “liking” as dissociable components of reward. In the last part of the paper, we will indicate possible theoretical implications for a neuropsychoanalytic understanding of libido-independent intrinsic motivations and their relationship with the self, including neuroscientific observations on self-related processes, agency, body-ownerships, and attachment.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
16625161
Volume :
12
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.08f55ffa4f7f4d9ea49ed44423773c66
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00359