Realizing the potential of distributed energy resources and peer-to-peer trading through consensus-based coordination and cooperative game theory

Driven by environmental and energy security concerns, a large number of small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs) are increasingly being connected to the distribution network. This helps to support a cost-effective transition to a lower-carbon energy system, however, brings coordination challenges caused by variability and uncertainty of renewable energy resources (RES). In this setting, local flexible demand (FD) and energy storage (ES) technologies have attracted great interests due to their potential flexibility in mitigating the generation and demand variability and improving the cost efficiency of low-carbon electricity systems. The combined effect of deregulation and digitalization inspired new ways of exchanging electricity and providing management/services on the paradigm of peer-to-peer (P2P) and transparent transactions. P2P energy trading enables direct energy trading between prosumers, which incentivizes active participation of prosumer in the trading of electricity in the distribution network, in the meantime, the efficient usage of FD and ES owned by the prosumers also facilitates better local power and energy balance. Though the promising P2P energy trading brings numerous advancements, the existing P2P mechanisms either fail to coordinate energy in a fully distributed way or are unable to adequately incentivize prosumers to participate, preventing prosumers from accessing the highest achievable monetary benefits and/or suffering severely from the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, this thesis aims at proposing three P2P energy trading enabling mechanisms in the aspect of fully distributed efficient balanced energy coordination through consensus-based algorithm and two incentivizing pricing and benefit distribution mechanisms through cooperative game theory. Distributed, consensus-based algorithms have emerged as a promising approach for the coordination of DER due to their communication, computation, privacy and reliability advantages over centralized approaches. However, state-of-the-art consensus-based algorithms address the DER coordination problem in independent time periods and therefore are inherently unable to capture the time-coupling operating characteristics of FD and ES resources. This thesis demonstrates that state-of-the-art algorithms fail to converge when these time-coupling characteristics are considered. In order to address this fundamental limitation, a novel consensus-based algorithm is proposed which includes additional consensus variables. These variables express relative maximum power limits imposed on the FD and ES resources which effectively mitigate the concentration of the FD and ES responses at the same time periods and steer the consensual outcome to a feasible and optimal solution. The convergence and optimality of the proposed algorithm are theoretically proven while case studies numerically demonstrate its convergence, optimality, robustness to initialization and information loss, and plug-and-play adaptability. Moreover, this thesis proposes two computationally efficient pricing and benefit distribution mechanisms to construct a stable grand coalition of prosumers participating in P2P trading, founded on cooperative game-theoretic principles. The first one involves a benefit distribution scheme inspired by the core tatonnement process while the second involves a novel pricing mechanism based on the solution of single linear programming. The performance of the proposed mechanisms is validated against state-of-the-art mechanisms through numerous case studies using real-world data. The results demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms exhibit superior computational performance than the nucleolus and are superior to the rest of the examined mechanisms in incentivizing prosumers to remain in the grand coalition.