Lewisian theism

Lewis's modal realism is the view that possible worlds are maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally connected individuals. Classical theism is the view that God is necessary, unitary, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, simple, and the creator and sustainer of all existence. Lewisian theism is the conjunction of modal realism with classical theism. In my thesis by interrelated papers, I argue, firstly, that Lewisian theism is consistent, provided certain theoretical revisions are made to modal realism, and, secondly, that Lewisian theism has the resources to solve certain philosophico-theological problems. In the prologue, I introduce the thesis and expound Lewisian theism. In the first substantive paper, I argue that God's necessity is incompatible with counterpart theory; but, in the second, I argue, contra the dominant view in the literature, that if we eschew counterpart theory for analysing God's necessity, Lewisian theism is consistent. The third and fourth papers concern material adequacy; the third concerns the existence of evil worlds, wherein I argue that Lewisian theists can non-problematically deny the existence of such worlds; and the fourth concerns the existence of an empty world, wherein I argue that Lewisian theists can supply such a world. The fifth paper concerns Lewisian theism's ability to solve a philosophico-theological problem; herein, I argue, firstly, that a valid version of the contingency argument against divine simplicity can be supplied (contra some philosophers), and secondly that Lewisian theism has the resources to render this argument unsound. The last paper contains an abductive argument for the existence of God from modal realism; I argue that the best way to account for the truths of advanced modal claims is to posit the existence of God.