Temporal Network Creation Games: The Impact of Non-Locality and Terminals

We live in a world full of networks where our economy, our communication, and even our social life crucially depends on them. These networks typically emerge from the interaction of many entities, which is why researchers study agent-based models of network formation. While traditionally static networks with a fixed set of links were considered, a recent stream of works focuses on networks whose behavior may change over time. In particular, Bil\`o et al. (IJCAI 2023) recently introduced a game-theoretic network formation model that embeds temporal aspects in networks. More precisely, a network is formed by selfish agents corresponding to nodes in a given host network with edges having labels denoting their availability over time. Each agent strategically selects local, i.e., incident, edges to ensure temporal reachability towards everyone at low cost. In this work we set out to explore the impact of two novel conceptual features: agents are no longer restricted to creating incident edges, called the global setting, and agents might only want to ensure that they can reach a subset of the other nodes, called the terminal model. For both, we study the existence, structure, and quality of equilibrium networks. For the terminal model, we prove that many core properties crucially depend on the number of terminals. We also develop a novel tool that allows translating equilibrium constructions from the non-terminal model to the terminal model. For the global setting, we show the surprising result that equilibria in the global and the local model are incomparable and we establish a high lower bound on the Price of Anarchy of the global setting that matches the upper bound of the local model. This shows the counter-intuitive fact that allowing agents more flexibility in edge creation does not improve the quality of equilibrium networks.