Problem horizontalne razsežnosti precedenčnega učinka odločitev Ustavnega sodišča

Pričujoče delo obravnava vprašanje, ali je Ustavno sodišče vezano na svoje odločitve. V prvem poglavju predstavim dve pojmovanji vloge preteklih sodnih odločitev v razlogovanju sodišč. V skladu s prvim pogledom je sodišče na preteklo odločitev vezano tako, da lahko od nje odstopi le, če so za to podani razlogi posebne vrste ali teže, ne pa vselej, kadar meni, da je odločitev napačna. Drugo pojmovanje pa sodišču nudi več manevrskega prostora: svoje pravno stališče lahko spremeni, če za to ponudi razumno utemeljitev. Preostanek dela je posvečen ovrednotenju treh argumentov v prid tezi, da prvi pogled najbolje opisuje držo, ki bi jo Ustavno sodišče pravno gledano moralo zavzeti do svojih odločitev. V drugem poglavju obravnavam možnost utemeljitve takšne obveznosti z zavezujočo naravo ustavnosodnih odločitev. Tretje poglavje se osredotoča na utemeljitev, ki se naslanja na 22. člen Ustave (enako varstvo pravic). Četrto poglavje obravnava hipotetičen poskus obrambe vezanosti Ustavnega sodišča na lastne odločitve, ki se ne opira na kodificiran pravni vir, kot je Ustava, temveč na dolgotrajno prakso Ustavnega sodišča. The aim of this thesis is to explore the question of whether the Slovenian Constitutional Court is legally bound by its own decisions. In the first chapter, I distinguish two alternative conceptions of how past judicial decisions may be relevant to the decision-making of a later court. On the first account, the court is bound by a previous decision in the sense of only being permitted to depart from it when reasons of special kind or weight obtain, not whenever it deems that decision wrong. On the second view, the court has more latitude: it may always change its mind on a legal issue as long as it provides a reasonable justification for doing so. In the remainder of the thesis, I evaluate three arguments in favour of the claim that the first view most faithfully describes the attitude which the Constitutional Court legally ought to adopt towards its own decisions. The second chapter examines the possibility of grounding such an obligation in the binding nature of the decisions of the Constitutional Court. The third chapter focuses on the justification based on the Article 22 of the Constitution (equal protection of rights). The fourth chapter considers a hypothetical attempt to justify the obligation of the Constitutional Court to follow its own decisions by relying on the long-standing practices of the Court rather than on a codified legal source such as the Constitution.