Epistemic supervenience, anti-individualism and knowledge-first epistemology

In recent work we have argued that so-called robust virtue epistemology exemplifies a version of epistemic individualism according to which warrant -i.e., what converts true belief into knowledge- supervenes on internal physical properties of individuals, perhapsin conjunction with local environmental properties. We have presented robust virtue epistemology with various epistemic twin earth scenarios which demonstrate that warrant supervenes in part on wider environmental properties, and which hence provide support for epistemic anti-individualism. In this paper we argue first that so-called evidentialist mentalism also exemplifies a version of epistemic individualism which faces a related epistemic twin earth scenario. We then argue that even though a knowledge-first approach in epistemology is in principle consistent with epistemic anti-individualism, this approach fails to offer a plausible account of epistemic supervenience. The upshot is that further support is provided for epistemic anti-individualism, and a prima facie case is made for embedding such an approachoutside of the knowledge-first framework.