The Source of Epistemic Normativity: Scientific Change as an Explanatory Problem

In this paper, I present the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, that is, as a philosophical problem concerning what logical forms of explanation we should employ in order to understand the major conceptual ruptures throughout the history of science. I distinguish between two logical forms of explanation: (a) empirical-scientific and (b) normative explanations. Based on this distinction, I distinguish between the scientific and the liberal versions of naturalism concerning the issue of scientific change. I argue in favor of the latter by showing that normative explanations are indispensable in order to fully understand scientific change. I also argue that we can defend scientific rationality without violating the naturalistic framework which is dominant in contemporary analytic philosophy. I conclude that endorsing scientific realism within a naturalistic framework is the only option for preserving scientific rationality. © The Author(s) 2021.