Cite
Fine-tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The case for remunerating bankers through bail-inable debt
MLA
Martino, E. D. Fine-Tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The Case for Remunerating Bankers through Bail-Inable Debt. Oct. 2020. EBSCOhost, widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edsair&AN=edsair.narcis........152e48f27f01e86ad50c8f52c3619271&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.
APA
Martino, E. D. (2020). Fine-tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The case for remunerating bankers through bail-inable debt.
Chicago
Martino, E.D. 2020. “Fine-Tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The Case for Remunerating Bankers through Bail-Inable Debt,” October. http://widgets.ebscohost.com/prod/customlink/proxify/proxify.php?count=1&encode=0&proxy=&find_1=&replace_1=&target=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&scope=site&db=edsair&AN=edsair.narcis........152e48f27f01e86ad50c8f52c3619271&authtype=sso&custid=ns315887.