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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment
- Publication Year :
- 2008
- Publisher :
- München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), 2008.
-
Abstract
- We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.
- Subjects :
- Test
experiment
incentives
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
law and economics
law and economics, incentives, crowding out, experiment
efficiency
crowding out
ddc:330
veil of ignorance, social preferences, equality, efficiency, experiment
equality
veil of ignorance
D63
D64
Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie
C99
social preferences
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....f30e8a9c16e699227c7a80738f04965f