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Medieval corporations, membership and the common good: rethinking the critique of shareholder primacy
- Source :
- Journal of Institutional Economics. 16:579-595
- Publication Year :
- 2019
- Publisher :
- Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2019.
-
Abstract
- The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate from its shareholders. However, the premise that shareholders have sole legitimate claim to ‘membership’ has rarely been questioned. This article explores medieval thought on ownership, authority and participation in guilds, churches, towns and universities, and shows that membership can be understood as participation in, and shared responsibility for, a group's distinct collaborative activity over time. Our theory suggests that ‘membership’ in the modern corporation extends to non-shareholding stakeholders, but with the implication that ownership and authority are vested in the members as a body and not in a separate entity.
- Subjects :
- HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Institutional theories of the firm
T-NDAS
History of legal and political thought
Corporation
Shareholder
Shareholder primacy
Premise
Business ethics
HD28
Business
Corporate governance reform
BDC
Shared responsibility
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
R2C
Law and economics
Separate legal entity
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 17441382 and 17441374
- Volume :
- 16
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of Institutional Economics
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....e9637e5765a752f65036bed84c9cfbc6
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137419000146