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A folk theorem for minority games
- Source :
- Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2005, Vol. 53, N°2, pp. 208-230. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.013⟩
- Publication Year :
- 2005
- Publisher :
- Elsevier Science Limited, 2005.
-
Abstract
- International audience; We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name “minority game”). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff, and as an almost sure equilibrium payoff. In particular we construct an inefficient equilibrium where, with probability one, all players choose the same room at almost all stages. This equilibrium is sustained by punishment phases which use, in an unusual way, the pure actions that were played before the start of the punishment.
- Subjects :
- TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics
Sequential game
Repeated games
imperfect monitoring
public signals
Public signals
Microeconomics
Example of a game without a value
0502 economics and business
Economics
050207 economics
Folk theorem
[MATH]Mathematics [math]
Non-cooperative game
Settore SECS-S/06 - Metodi mat. dell'economia e Scienze Attuariali e Finanziarie
050208 finance
Imperfect monitoring
05 social sciences
Stochastic game
Symmetric game
jel:C72
ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING
TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
16. Peace & justice
Minimax
Repeated game
Mathematical economics
Finance
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2005, Vol. 53, N°2, pp. 208-230. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.013⟩
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....e807bcd698ef4ab92228f7d23f4a711d