Hydropolitics and Conflict Management in Transboundary River Basins

This thesis set out to develop methodologies that promote cooperation, peace and development instead of conflict and violence in transboundary water resources management. In particular, its objectives were the following: o To examine and understand the complexity of water systems and water conflict management o To investigate factors affecting resilience of water treaties o To develop methods for equitable water allocation in transboundary river basins using bankruptcy theory o To develop a risk-based Multi Attribute Decision Making method (RB-MADM) to select, rank and/or classify alternatives among a set of available options in negotiation and decision making processes over shared natural resources o To demonstrate the applicability of the developed methods in practice through some real cases: the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the Caspian Sea. This thesis starts with an in-depth discussion of the complexity of transboundary water systems and the nexus between resource scarcity and resource conflict. Water systems are complex coupled human-natural systems. This complexity can be exacerbated when water is shared between two or more riparian countries. Shared water resources can be a source of both conflict and cooperation among riparian countries. Conflict resolution in a complex system is also a complex task that cannot be managed by means of scientific methods or modelling approaches only. This thesis focuses on conflict resolution in transboundary river basins. Rather than looking at the issues just from a technical point of view, the research endeavours to recognize the complexity in conflict resolution in transboundary river basins. The nexus between resource scarcity and resource conflict is analyzed in terms of several schools of thought, including the Neo-Malthusians, Cornucopians, and the Distributionists. Furthermore, the missing link between water scarcity, as a main issue in international water resources management, and water crisis and conflict is examined. The evidence suggests that water scarcity can be both a cause and the result of conflict. Water systems have been affected by various human and natural perturbations and changes, such as global environmental and climate changes that are at least partly humanly induced. These disturbances can potentially affect conflict and cooperation between riparian countries. Water treaties should be resilient to cope with these changes and disturbances. Chapter three raises questions concerning main factors affecting non-resilience of water treaties as well as some reasons increasing the difficulty of implementation of treaties. Additional insights into these factors can help to enhance their resilience and reduce the risk of conflict among riparian countries. Among several factors affecting hydropolitical relationships, water quantity is the perhaps most conflictive issue. The principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization” is the main normative principle referred to for allocating internationally shared water resources. Despite this, a serious limitation of international water laws and conventions is that they have not introduced a generally accepted allocation mechanism to achieve an equitable and reasonable water allocation. Therefore, equitable water allocation among riparian countries is one of the main critical issues in water conflict management. Using bankruptcy theory, as a form of cooperative game theory method, novel flexible allocation methods have been developed in chapters four and five. The proposed rules have been applied to the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, shared between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, to illustrate the application of the rule to a real conflictive allocation problem. The results reveal that the proposed approaches may facilitate negotiation and have a great potential to help solving conflict and dispute over river resources allocation problems in transboundary river basins. A risk-based Multi Attribute Decision Making method was developed to support consensus-based decision making over several allocation mechanisms. This method was applied to help establish the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which is shared among five states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. To date, these nations have been unable to reach an allocation agreement. We apply a methodology to propose the most appropriate solution among a set of options under different risk attitudes of the states. The analyses show that the overall ranking of options varies even when the states slightly change their risk attitudes from pessimistic to fairly pessimistic.