Back to Search
Start Over
Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement
- Source :
- Journal of Labor Economics. 37:621-662
- Publication Year :
- 2019
- Publisher :
- University of Chicago Press, 2019.
-
Abstract
- We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives (Barlevy and Neal 2012) outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of close attention to performance pay design.
- Subjects :
- Economics and Econometrics
Labour economics
Incentive design
media_common.quotation_subject
Distribution (economics)
law.invention
Randomized controlled trial
law
Political science
Student achievement
Pedagogy
0502 economics and business
ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDEDUCATION
Mathematics education
050207 economics
Marketing
China
media_common
Class (computer programming)
business.industry
05 social sciences
Payment
Incentive
Industrial relations
Psychology
business
Performance pay
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 15375307 and 0734306X
- Volume :
- 37
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....d4d268c9e42c2446808c5975adfb7c6c