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Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement

Authors :
James Chu
Chengfang Liu
Yaojiang Shi
Prashant Loyalka
Sean Sylvia
Source :
Journal of Labor Economics. 37:621-662
Publication Year :
2019
Publisher :
University of Chicago Press, 2019.

Abstract

We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives (Barlevy and Neal 2012) outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of close attention to performance pay design.

Details

ISSN :
15375307 and 0734306X
Volume :
37
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Journal of Labor Economics
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....d4d268c9e42c2446808c5975adfb7c6c