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A Tutorial-Style Introduction to $$\textsf {DY}^\star $$

Authors :
Ralf Küsters
Quoc Huy Do
Tim Würtele
Guido Schmitz
Pedram Hosseyni
Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Abhishek Bichhawat
Programming securely with cryptography (PROSECCO)
Inria de Paris
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
Indian Institute of Technology [Gandhinagar] ( IIT Gandhinagar )
University of Stuttgart
Royal Holloway [University of London] (RHUL)
Daniel Dougherty
José Meseguer
Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim
Paul Rowe
Source :
Protocols, Strands, and Logic ISBN: 9783030916305, Protocols, Strands, and Logic, Daniel Dougherty; José Meseguer; Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim; Paul Rowe. Protocols, Strands, and Logic, 13066, Springer International Publishing, pp.77-97, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4⟩
Publication Year :
2021
Publisher :
Springer International Publishing, 2021.

Abstract

\(\textsf {DY}^\star \) is a recently proposed formal verification framework for the symbolic security analysis of cryptographic protocol code written in the \(\textsf {F}^\star \) programming language. Unlike automated symbolic provers, \(\textsf {DY}^\star \) accounts for advanced protocol features like unbounded loops and mutable recursive data structures as well as low-level implementation details like protocol state machines and message formats, which are often at the root of real-world attacks. Protocols modeled in \(\textsf {DY}^\star \) can be executed, and hence, tested, and they can even interoperate with real-world counterparts. \(\textsf {DY}^\star \) extends a long line of research on using dependent type systems but takes a fundamentally new approach by explicitly modeling the global trace-based semantics within the framework, hence bridging the gap between trace-based and type-based protocol analyses. With this, one can uniformly, precisely, and soundly model, for the first time using dependent types, long-lived mutable protocol state, equational theories, fine-grained dynamic corruption, and trace-based security properties like forward secrecy and post-compromise security.

Details

ISBN :
978-3-030-91630-5
ISBNs :
9783030916305
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Protocols, Strands, and Logic ISBN: 9783030916305, Protocols, Strands, and Logic, Daniel Dougherty; José Meseguer; Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim; Paul Rowe. Protocols, Strands, and Logic, 13066, Springer International Publishing, pp.77-97, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4⟩
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....c9a3ee19294d8e02a7f29ad4f772cb0e