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Efficient Non-malleable Codes and Key-Derivation for Poly-size Tampering Circuits

Authors :
Daniele Venturi
Daniel Wichs
Sebastian Faust
Pratyay Mukherjee
Nguyen, Phong Q.
Oswald , Elisabeth
Source :
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014 ISBN: 9783642552199, EUROCRYPT, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Faust, S, Mukherjee, P, Venturi, D & Wichs, D 2014, Efficient Non-malleable Codes and Key-Derivation for Poly-size Tampering Circuits . in P Q Nguyen & E Oswald (eds), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014 : 33rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 11-15, 2014. Proceedings . Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8441, pp. 111-128, Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, 11/05/2014 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_7
Publication Year :
2014
Publisher :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014.

Abstract

Non-malleable codes, defined by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10), provide roughly the following guarantee: if a codeword $c$ encoding some message $x$ is tampered to $c' = f(c)$ such that $c' \neq c$ , then the tampered message $x'$ contained in $c'$ reveals no information about $x$ . The non-malleable codes have applications to immunizing cryptosystems against tampering attacks and related-key attacks. One cannot have an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all efficient tampering functions $f$ . However, in this paper we show “the next best thing”: for any polynomial bound $s$ given a-priori, there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all tampering functions $f$ computable by a circuit of size $s$ . More generally, for any family of tampering functions $ \mathcal {F}$ of size $| \mathcal {F}| \leq 2^{s}$ , there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all $f \in \mathcal {F} $ . The rate of our codes, defined as the ratio of message to codeword size, approaches 1. Our results are information-theoretic and our main proof technique relies on a careful probabilistic method argument using limited independence. As a result, we get an efficiently samplable family of efficient codes, such that a random member of the family is non-malleable with overwhelming probability. Alternatively, we can view the result as providing an efficient non-malleable code in the “common reference string” model. We also introduce a new notion of non-malleable key derivation, which uses randomness $x$ to derive a secret key $y = h(x)$ in such a way that, even if $x$ is tampered to a different value $x' = f(x)$ , the derived key $y' = h(x')$ does not reveal any information about $y$ . Our results for non-malleable key derivation are analogous to those for non-malleable codes. As a useful tool in our analysis, we rely on the notion of “leakage-resilient storage” of Davi, Dziembowski, and Venturi (SCN ’10), and, as a result of independent interest, we also significantly improve on the parameters of such schemes.

Details

ISBN :
978-3-642-55219-9
ISBNs :
9783642552199
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014 ISBN: 9783642552199, EUROCRYPT, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Faust, S, Mukherjee, P, Venturi, D & Wichs, D 2014, Efficient Non-malleable Codes and Key-Derivation for Poly-size Tampering Circuits . in P Q Nguyen & E Oswald (eds), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2014 : 33rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 11-15, 2014. Proceedings . Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8441, pp. 111-128, Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, 11/05/2014 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_7
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....c2c27d6bb212d9ff3dea9182d067a9e5