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Hardware-Based Trusted Computing Architectures for Isolation and Attestation
- Source :
- IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Publication Year :
- 2018
-
Abstract
- © 2016 IEEE. Attackers target many different types of computer systems in use today, exploiting software vulnerabilities to take over the device and make it act maliciously. Reports of numerous attacks have been published, against the constrained embedded devices of the Internet of Things, mobile devices like smartphones and tablets, high-performance desktop and server environments, as well as complex industrial control systems. Trusted computing architectures give users and remote parties like software vendors guarantees about the behaviour of the software they run, protecting them against software-level attackers. This paper defines the security properties offered by them, and presents detailed descriptions of twelve hardware-based attestation and isolation architectures from academia and industry. We compare all twelve designs with respect to the security properties and architectural features they offer. The presented architectures have been designed for a wide range of devices, supporting different security properties. ispartof: IEEE Transactions on Computers vol:67 issue:3 pages:361-374 status: published
- Subjects :
- Computer science
Mobile computing
Vulnerability
02 engineering and technology
Encryption
Computer security
computer.software_genre
Theoretical Computer Science
020204 information systems
0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering
Direct Anonymous Attestation
Software measurement
business.industry
020206 networking & telecommunications
Industrial control system
Trusted Computing
Trusted Network Connect
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Hardware and Architecture
Operating system
Trusted Platform Module
business
Mobile device
computer
Software
Computer hardware
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 00189340
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....ac133e9c66fe742a72227780e49f404b
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2017.2647955