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Weak Probabilistic Anonymity

Authors :
Jun Pang
Yuxin Deng
Catuscia Palamidessi
Preuves, Programmes et Systèmes (PPS)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 (UPD7)
Concurrency, Mobility and Transactions (COMETE)
Inria Saclay - Ile de France
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau] (LIX)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École polytechnique (X)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École polytechnique (X)
Michael Backes and Andre Scedrov
Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 (UPD7)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau] (LIX)
École polytechnique (X)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École polytechnique (X)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Inria Saclay - Ile de France
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)
Source :
3rd International Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo), 3rd International Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo), Aug 2005, San Francisco, United States. pp.55-76, ⟨10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.043⟩
Publication Year :
2007
Publisher :
Elsevier BV, 2007.

Abstract

International audience; Anonymity means that the identity of the user performing a certain action is maintained secret. The protocols for ensuring anonymity often use random mechanisms which can be described probabilistically. In this paper we propose a notion of weak probabilistic anonymity, where weak refers to the fact that some amount of probabilistic information may be revealed by the protocol. This information can be used by an observer to infer the likeliness that the action has been performed by a certain user. The aim of this work is to study the degree of anonymity that the protocol can still ensure, despite the leakage of information. We illustrate our ideas by using the example of the dining cryptographers with biased coins. We consider both the cases of nondeterministic and probabilistic users. Correspondingly, we propose two notions of weak anonymity and we investigate their respective dependencies on the biased factor of the coins.

Details

ISSN :
15710661
Volume :
180
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....a4840cf1e7c81c351bc7903b3e6a1bae
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.047