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A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model: Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment
- Source :
- Economia Politica Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Economia Politica Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer, 2021
- Publication Year :
- 2021
- Publisher :
- HAL CCSD, 2021.
-
Abstract
- The orthodox theory of wage negotiations considers that the trade union monopoly causes a rigidity of real wages which is, itself, the cause of unemployment. The model of this negotiation ("Nash bargaining") only considers situations where negotiations between union and firm succeed. In this article, we attempt to read the WS-PS model from a Keynesian point of view. Our model reflects the fact that successful negotiation is only one case among other situations, including failure where the union expresses a claim that is not necessarily satisfied. Although, in situations close to full employment, there is a bargaining mechanism by which unions and firms reach an agreement, this is not the case in times of massive unemployment. In the latter situation, employment is unilaterally determined by firms, on the basis of previous demand.
- Subjects :
- Economics and Econometrics
Bargaining problem
Sociology and Political Science
Full employment
media_common.quotation_subject
Keynesian economics
05 social sciences
Wage
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Negotiation
8. Economic growth
0502 economics and business
Unemployment
Trade union
Economics
050207 economics
Real wages
Monopoly
Finance
ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
media_common
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 1973820X
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Economia Politica Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Economia Politica Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer, 2021
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....a39d569e1135390d62d1de26d549c013