Back to Search
Start Over
Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid auction with K-Lipschitz supply functions
- Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum unit price p. The market clears at the price at which the aggregate demand intersects the total supply and firms are paid the bid prices. We study a game theoretic model of competition among such firms and focus on its equilibria (Supply function equilibrium). The game we consider is a generalization of both models where firms can either set a fixed quantity (Cournot model) or set a fixed price (Bertrand model). Our main result is to prove existence and provide a characterization of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the space of K-Lipschitz supply functions.<br />6 pages, 5 figures, to appear Proc. of the 22nd International Federation of Automatic Control World Congress (IFAC 2023)
- Subjects :
- Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Optimization and Control (math.OC)
FOS: Electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering
FOS: Mathematics
Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
Computer Science - Social and Information Networks
Systems and Control (eess.SY)
Electrical Engineering and Systems Science - Systems and Control
Mathematics - Optimization and Control
Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....9e3bd8ea14f64cf9f013438dd6961a46