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Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant

Authors :
Konstantin Sonin
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE)
École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)
Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Paris School of Economics (PSE)
École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)
Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
CEFIR
Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
CEPR
Source :
Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 35 (2), pp.253-442. ⟨10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.009⟩
Publication Year :
2007

Abstract

We study the nature of judicial bias in bankruptcy proceedings following the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law in Russia. The two main findings are as follows. First, regional political characteristics affected judicial decisions about the number and types of bankruptcy proceedings initiated after the law took effect. Controlling for indicators of firms' insolvency and the quality of the regional judiciary, reorganization procedures were significantly more frequent in regions with politically popular governors and governors who had hostile relations with the federal center. Poor judicial quality was also associated with higher incidence of reorganizations. Second, the quality of the regional judiciary affected performance of firms under the reorganization procedure: in regions with low quality judges, firms that were reorganized according to the 1998 law had significantly lower growth in sales, labor productivity, and product variety compared to firms not subject to bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast, in regions with high quality judges, firms in reorganization outperformed firms not in bankruptcy proceedings. This effect of judicial quality on the performance of reorganized firms was stronger when governors were politically popular. These findings are consistent with the view that politically strong governors subverted enforcement of the 1998 bankruptcy law. Journal of Comparative Economics35 (2) (2007) 254-277.

Details

ISSN :
01475967 and 10957227
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 35 (2), pp.253-442. ⟨10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.009⟩
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....766095a64632fb523a76e99d4c82bdc9
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.009⟩