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Two-Sided Matching Markets with Strongly Correlated Preferences

Authors :
Hugo Gimbert
Claire Mathieu
Simon Mauras
Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale (IRIF (UMR_8243))
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Paris (UP)
Source :
Fundamentals of Computation Theory, Fundamentals of Computation Theory, 12867, Springer International Publishing, pp.3-17, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_1⟩, Fundamentals of Computation Theory ISBN: 9783030865924, FCT
Publication Year :
2021
Publisher :
HAL CCSD, 2021.

Abstract

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who designed the celebrated “deferred acceptance” algorithm for the problem.

Details

Language :
English
ISBN :
978-3-030-86592-4
ISBNs :
9783030865924
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Fundamentals of Computation Theory, Fundamentals of Computation Theory, 12867, Springer International Publishing, pp.3-17, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_1⟩, Fundamentals of Computation Theory ISBN: 9783030865924, FCT
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....710f308ace1e5a00cfb76a8707e8bf6c
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_1⟩