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The London Stock Exchange: Strategic Corporate Governance Restructuring After Demutualization
- Source :
- Journal of Applied Business Research, Journal of Applied Business Research, Clute Institute, 2014, 30 (1), pp.211-226. 〈http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/JABR/article/view/8296/8327〉, Journal of Applied Business Research, Clute Institute, 2014, 30 (1), pp.211-226
- Publication Year :
- 2014
- Publisher :
- HAL CCSD, 2014.
-
Abstract
- International audience; This study uses the London Stock Exchange (LSE), forced to demutualize due to major changes in its business environment, notably due to increased competition and technological advances, as field experiment to study corporate governance restructuring to adapt to new market conditions. The LSE improved its financial situation after demutualization and is an example of successful corporate governance restructuring. The LSE significantly restructured the composition of its board of directors following demutualization. The number of exchange members on the LSE board decreased after demutualization while the number of independent directors increased, pointing to a more “monitoring board”, in support of an agency theory approach. Interestingly, the large majority of these independent directors had experiences in diverse business.The LSE significantly reorganized its management team to adapt to the new strategies triggered by demutualization and modified its compensation by increasing performance-related payments. Results suggest that demutualization brings efficiencies if accompanied by changes in the governing bodies and in the incentive structures of the exchanges. Most of our results could be relevant also, for example, for firms going public, for smaller firms that are expanding their activities and searching for outside investors and for companies facing major changes in their business environments.
- Subjects :
- [QFIN.GN] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]
Restructuring
media_common.quotation_subject
Principal–agent problem
Accounting
IRG_AXE1
London Stock Exchange
JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
Competition (economics)
Corporate Governance
[ QFIN.GN ] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]
Stock exchange
0502 economics and business
Economics
JEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Demutualization
050207 economics
Business and International Management
[ SHS.GESTION ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
media_common
[QFIN.GN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]
050208 finance
business.industry
Corporate governance
05 social sciences
Business Strategy
Payment
JEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
Incentive
JEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
Strategic management
[SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
business
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08927626
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of Applied Business Research, Journal of Applied Business Research, Clute Institute, 2014, 30 (1), pp.211-226. 〈http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/JABR/article/view/8296/8327〉, Journal of Applied Business Research, Clute Institute, 2014, 30 (1), pp.211-226
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....70677247047e662d3f119a50d2e0e99a