Back to Search
Start Over
Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game
- Source :
- SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Publication Year :
- 2018
- Publisher :
- Elsevier BV, 2018.
-
Abstract
- We consider a model of bottleneck congestion in discrete time with a penalty cost for being late. This model can be applied to several situations where agents need to use a capacitated facility in order to complete a task before a hard deadline. A possible example is a situation where commuters use a train service to go from home to office in the early morning. Trains run at regular intervals, take always the same time to cover their itinerary, and have a fixed capacity. Commuters must reach their office in time. This is a hard constraint whose violation involves a heavy penalty. Conditionally on meeting the deadline, commuters want to take the train as late as possible. With the intent of considering strategic choices of departure, we model this situation as a game and we show that it does not have pure Nash equilibria. Then we characterize the best and worst mixed Nash equilibria, and show that they are both inefficient with respect to the social optimum. We then show that there exists a correlated equilibrium that approximates the social optimum when the penalty for missing the deadline is sufficiently large.
- Subjects :
- TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
price of anarchy
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Correlated equilibrium
Mathematical optimization
Computer science
price of correlated stability
Nash equilibrium
price of stability
Bottleneck
correlated equilibrium
Task (project management)
symbols.namesake
Discrete time and continuous time
symbols
Price of anarchy
[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration
Train
efficiency of equilibria
Price of stability
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 15565068
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....6c196e15082d3eebb1df66de135530c1