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The Cost of Political Connections*

Authors :
Francis Kramarz
Marianne Bertrand
David Thesmar
Antoinette Schoar
Sloan School of Management
Source :
Prof. Schoar via Shikha Sharma
Publication Year :
2018
Publisher :
Oxford University Press (OUP), 2018.

Abstract

Using plant-level data from France, we document a potential cost of political connections for firms that is not offset by other benefits. Politically connected CEOs alter corporate employment decisions to help (regional) politicians in their re-election efforts by having higher job and plant creation rates, and lower rates of destruction in election years, especially in politically contested areas. There is little evidence that connected firms benefit from preferential access to government resources, such as subsidies or tax exemptions. Connected firms are less profitable in the cross-section and also experience a drop in profitability when a connected CEO comes to power.

Details

ISSN :
1573692X and 15723097
Volume :
22
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Review of Finance
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....57270981b3389d21a1066cbca5a503ff
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfy008