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Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism
- Source :
- Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy
- Publication Year :
- 2021
- Publisher :
- Springer Netherlands, 2021.
-
Abstract
- In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.
- Subjects :
- Value (ethics)
Value-ladenne
Health (social science)
Health Policy
Harm
Medical law
Scientific Contribution
Non-epistemic values
Education
Epistemology
Focus (linguistics)
Value-ladenness
Philosophy of biology
Non-epistemic value
Philosophy of medicine
Disease, Harm, Naturalism, Non-epistemic values, Normativism, Value-ladenness
Normative
Humans
Disease
Philosophy, Medical
Psychology
Normativism
Naturalism
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 15728633 and 13867423
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....56b65d4d8e8821e3b4160f7adf33875b