MACHIAVELLI BEFORE PARETO: FOXES, LIONS, AND THE SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM AS THE RESULT OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS

This article examines the way Vilfredo Pareto addresses the dynamics of social equilibrium and the evolution of economic institutions based on the principle of the rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. In the first part, we analyze why and how Pareto’s categories(residues, derivations, interests, \social heterogeneity, logical actions, andnon-logical1actions)borrow from those of Machiavelli(virtù, fortuna, corruptio, andordine)to define various forms of the Machiavellian Moment. In the second part, we show that this borrowing allows Pareto to explain: (i) the evolution of political equilibriums, from the distinction the author makes between “Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology” and “Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy”; and (ii) the alternative between free trade and protectionism.