North Korea in 1974

FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS preoccupied the attention of the North Korean leadership to an unusual degree in 1974 in response to the fundamental changes taking place in the Asian international environment. The major foreign policy goals continue to be completion of the revolution in all of Korea and promotion of socialist construction and, by so doing, contribution to the development of a world revolution. No distinction between domestic policy objectives and foreign policy objectives is entertained. Foreign policy is viewed as another instrument, or a set of undertakings, for implementing important national tasks. To increase solidarity with international revolutionary forces, North Korea must: 1) strengthen ties with the third world countries as well as socialist countries; 2) establish diplomatic relations with South Korea's allies and, if possible, cut off South Korean ties with these nations; 3) forestall South Korea's effort to develop ties with socialist countries; 4) seek membership and participation in all types of international organizations, and 5) capture the allegiance of overseas Korean residents and mobilize them for its cause. The Soviet Union and China: From the North Korean perspective, the Soviet Union and China provide assurance for North Korean independence and security. These fraternal socialist countries are the forces to be relied upon in order to neutralize U.S. and Japanese capabilities. North Korea depends on the Soviet Union and China as a springboard for its diplomatic offensive, expecting to ride on the coattails of their power and influence in the international arena. North Korea's anguish over the Sino-Soviet conflict is tempered by an awareness that it provides the country with a measure of maneuverability and it attempts, with considerable success, to maintain a neutral stance. The Soviet Union and China have so far refrained from responding to South Korea's overtures for the development of contacts. North Korea's objection is not the sole reason for their negative attitude, but it is a powerful and effective one. Whether the public positions taken by the Soviet Union and China in support of North Korea's position represent pro-forma diplomatic support or genuine feeling, is another matter. Despite North Korea's apparent and professed confidence in the loyalty of its allies-specially China, whose relationship is characterized by "friendship and military unity forged and sealed in blood"-Western observers claim to perceive contra