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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

Authors :
Yannick Viossat
CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision (CEREMADE)
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)
Source :
Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, AIMS, 2014, pp.537-553
Publication Year :
2012
Publisher :
arXiv, 2012.

Abstract

International audience; If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

Details

ISSN :
21646066 and 21646074
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, AIMS, 2014, pp.537-553
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....20a792e428129ba174dd00641e9f4678
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1211.5329