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Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria
- Source :
- Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, AIMS, 2014, pp.537-553
- Publication Year :
- 2012
- Publisher :
- arXiv, 2012.
-
Abstract
- International audience; If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.
- Subjects :
- Statistics and Probability
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
FOS: Computer and information sciences
MSC classification: 91A22
Correlated equilibrium
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Symmetric equilibrium
[MATH.MATH-CA]Mathematics [math]/Classical Analysis and ODEs [math.CA]
replicator dynamics
Nash equilibrium
symbols.namesake
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
0502 economics and business
Economics
FOS: Mathematics
050207 economics
Mathematics - Optimization and Control
Nash equilibrium,replicator dynamics,best-reply dynamics
050205 econometrics
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
Applied Mathematics
05 social sciences
Normal-form game
TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Equilibrium selection
Optimization and Control (math.OC)
Modeling and Simulation
Best response
symbols
[MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
Epsilon-equilibrium
Solution concept
Mathematical economics
best-reply dynamics
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 21646066 and 21646074
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, AIMS, 2014, pp.537-553
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....20a792e428129ba174dd00641e9f4678
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1211.5329