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Genetic information and investment in human capital
- Source :
- Journal of health economics. 16(4)
- Publication Year :
- 1997
-
Abstract
- In a game of incomplete information we analyze the consequences of giving an employer access to imperfect genetic information about his employees. The employer chooses whether to invest in the employee and the employee chooses a life style. We derive the condition for markets of information services to exist and the conditions for when it is beneficial to the various parties. In one specification of the game, the mere introduction of the information service may change the employee's choice of health behavior, which means that the value of genetic information may be negative to the employer.
- Subjects :
- Value (ethics)
Service (business)
Employment
Information Services
Sweden
Health Policy
Health Behavior
Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
Genetic Diseases, Inborn
Bayes Theorem
Investment (macroeconomics)
Human capital
Value of information
Microeconomics
Complete information
Information system
Economics
Humans
Imperfect
Genetic Testing
Investments
Life Style
Employer Health Costs
Models, Econometric
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 01676296
- Volume :
- 16
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of health economics
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....110d7e59ab9f158de9da1ae6c9068250