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A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice
- Source :
- SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Publication Year :
- 2012
- Publisher :
- Elsevier BV, 2012.
-
Abstract
- In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.
Details
- ISSN :
- 15565068
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....0def0d5dfd0622234c55d71455404a78