Mobile termination benchmarking: the case of Namibia

PurposeThis paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.Design/methodology/approachThe methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.FindingsMobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.Research limitations/implicationsThe case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.Practical implicationsAfrican regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.Social implicationsCost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.Originality/valueThe paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.