Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Assessment

The debate over prostitution is probably as old as prostitution itself. And the discussion of the oldest profession is as alive today as it ever was. New books and articles are constantly being published, new scientific reports and theories presented, and new committees and commissions formed.1 Yet while the scientific and literary discussion is very much alive, the philosophical discussion of it seems never even to have come to life. How is this to be explained? And is there any justification for it? Could it be that harlotry is a topic unsuitable for philosophical treatment? Or could it be that, although suitable, it does not give rise to any interesting philosophical questions? Obviously, I would not be writing this article if I thought that the answer to any of these questions was yes. But I wish to emphasize that it seems absurd to maintain that the subject is unsuitable for philosophical treatment, since it clearly involves many normative and evaluative issues. Could it be instead that prostitution as a moral question belongs to casuistry or to applied ethics rather than to moral philosophy proper? Could it be that it does not give rise to any "high-level" questions of principle? This will not do as an explanation, for the same thing could be said just as appropriately about such topics as abortion, suicide, war, or mercy killing-topics that have been intensively discussed by philosophers. Nor can the explanation be that prostitution is regarded by philosophers as too unworthy or too base a subject to deal with, for that would put them in a prudish ivory tower, and this (I hope) they do not deserve.