Back to Search Start Over

Bank forbearance: A market-based explanation

Authors :
Lewis J. Spellman
Carolin D. Schellhorn
Source :
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 40:451-466
Publication Year :
2000
Publisher :
Elsevier BV, 2000.

Abstract

Why does forbearance for insolvent banks occur? We offer an explanation based on stockholders’ ability to appeal to the courts for reversal and monetary damages after the regulator has initiated a receivership action. Although this has always been theoretically possible, precedents and common law standards now exist. We calculate the market’s perceived postponement of receiverships for banks thought to be insolvent. We explain the receivership delays with the regulator’s reluctance to proceed when investors’ pricing of the bank’s stock and accountants’ assessment of the bank’s solvency do not support a receivership action. Our clinical evidence is consistent with this notion. Jel Classification: G180; G200; G210; G280

Details

ISSN :
10629769
Volume :
40
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Accession number :
edsair.doi...........d82b4b7eebede3a8e8b1429d59df7265
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1062-9769(00)00051-x