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Functional and normative delegation to non-majoritarian institutions: The case of the European Competition Network

Functional and normative delegation to non-majoritarian institutions: The case of the European Competition Network

Authors :
Imelda Maher
Source :
Comparative European Politics. 7:414-434
Publication Year :
2009
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2009.

Abstract

There is a normative and a functional dimension to delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. These dimensions are explored in this paper and considered in the context of the recent modernization of European Community (EC) competition law enforcement. The principal – agent model provides insights into how and why Member States delegate extensive enforcement powers to the EC Commission and the National Competition Authorities, but as it offers primarily a functional analysis the normative issues of control, accountability and legitimacy cannot be fully encapsulated within it. Thus, an analysis of the EC competition law regime requires consideration of both dimensions using the twin-track approach of principal – agent analysis and a rule of law analysis in order to understand how public power is and should be exercised within it.

Details

ISSN :
1740388X and 14724790
Volume :
7
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Comparative European Politics
Accession number :
edsair.doi...........d05f097422dd6db231d33af81bfbac0e
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2008.44