4: More than Words

Arguments for ad hoc nature of concepts come from two different sources, namely philosophy of language and psychology of categorization. This chapter focuses on philosophical arguments only. The ad hoc concepts may be useful scientific explananda for various cognitive activities, but their postulation as components of thought is not mandatory on purely philosophical and linguistic grounds. The author draws a map of possible views on the relationships between concepts, meanings and context. He uses as a test a wide-currency example in the contemporary debate, which involves metaphor, and he identifies and presents four alternative positions; two ad hoc concept views and two stable concept views. He describes in detail one of the four, namely the two-level stable concept view, together with some reasons for favouring it. The author defends the two-level stable concept view by providing evidence that concepts are more than words and considers some relevant possible objections. Keywords: ad hoc nature; contemporary debate; linguistic grounds; philosophical arguments; psychology of categorization; relevance theory