Does Investors' Desire to Punish Misreporting Affect Their Litigation Decisions and Managers' and Investors' Welfare?

Shareholder litigation is an important part of the regulation of securities markets that can influence corporate managers' reporting behavior. Prior research shows that conventional economic factors affect investors' litigation decisions. We use experimental markets to examine whether investors engage in costly litigation even without a direct financial incentive to do so and whether this affects managers' reporting decisions and managers' and investors' welfare. We find that investors frequently litigate when they can impose a financial penalty on managers for misreporting even though they cannot recover their legal fees or receive restitution for their losses. Moreover, this deters managers' shirking and misreporting and improves managers' and investors' welfare almost as effectively as when investors can recover their legal fees and receive restitution for their losses. Overall, our results indicate that, in addition to financial incentives, investors' desire to punish misreporting plays an important role in their litigation decisions, and that may yield substantial welfare benefits.