The Philosophical Critique of a Scientific Sociology: Some Remarks on Bryant's Defence

Christopher Bryant's defence of scientific sociology+ against its philosophical critics accepts their account of the 'humanistic', 'meaningful' basis of some kinds of sociological explanation.' What he rejects is the idea that sociology must be exclusively humanistic. While agreeing with what we take to be the aim of his paper, that is, to stress the strengths and importance of both modes of explanation as opposed to the prevailing dogmatic assertions of the exclusiveness of either,2 we wish to argue against major aspects of his account of these modes of explanation and the relationships between them. We believe that by accepting the philosophers' characterization of humanistic explanation, and particularly the radical distinction they draw between this and 'scientific' methodologies, Bryant both under-estimates the area of humanistic explanation and fails to explore similarities in and links between the methodologies of the two modes. We also contend that the scientific/humanist distinction is not best handled, as Bryant handles it, as about distinguishable 'categories of reality', which are in any case inadequately specified. Rather, the distinction is between 'levels' of explanation. This makes it possible to regard both kinds of explanation as adequate and makes explicit the links between them.