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Incentives and Regulation in Queues

Authors :
Kashi R. Balachandran
Source :
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ISBN: 9783540546351
Publication Year :
1991
Publisher :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991.

Abstract

It is known that customers seeking service in a queuing system tend to overcrowd the facility when making their individual decisions based on a consideration of the benefits they derive from the service and the cost due to waiting at the system. To obtain an optimal utilization it is necessary to restrict entry by pricing. In this paper, the effect of applying the operating cost of the service center to its users is analyzed.

Details

ISBN :
978-3-540-54635-1
ISBNs :
9783540546351
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ISBN: 9783540546351
Accession number :
edsair.doi...........a903907e7faae3fed8b873223f91d350
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58201-1_14