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Research has shown that both the support of anonymity and the use of appropriate incentives can lead to improved group performance. Anonymity enables a more open discussion resulting in a more critical analysis of a problem. Rewards can motivate individuals to cooperate, giving them the incentive to share valuable information with the group. Unfortunately, these two mechanisms are both dependent on the ability to identify the contributor. Anonymity hides the identity of the contributor, while the support of individualized, performance-based rewards requires the rewarding agent to be able to determine the identity of the contributor. This contradictory requirement has prevented the simultaneous used of anonymity and performance-based rewards in decision making. Using group decision support systems as a basis, this work identifies procedures to simultaneously support participant anonymity and performance-based rewards. Mechanisms based on public key encryption technologies are presented which make it possible to distribute individual rewards to anonymous contributors, guarantee that only the contributor can claim a reward for her contribution, verify that a reward has been distributed, and be able to deliver this reward in such a way that the identity of the anonymous contributor is protected. This is accomplished without the rewarding agent ever knowing the identity of the recipient.