Impact of employee mobility and employee performance on the allocation of rewards under conditions of constraint

We advanced and tested a multiple-motive model of resource allocation. In this model we identified important instrumental, social-emotional, and group maintenance goals, and asserted that rational managers will sometimes allocate reduced rewards to employees with constrained mobility. Consistent with predictions, managers allocated greater salary funds to more deserving employees: those with high competence and dedication. However, allocations also differed as a function of employee mobility. This effect was strongest among competent employees, whose membership was most desirable. Furthermore, the tendency to allocate lesser rewards to low-mobility employees was particularly pronounced under conditions of low reward availability and low labor availability. These effects were not mediated by changes in perceptions of the competence of low-mobility employees. The findings are discussed as a form of rational selective exploitation: The rational manager's need to attend to employee mobility, particularly under conditions of reward or labor constraint, may erode equity.