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Deference and Uniqueness
- Source :
- Philosophical Studies. 176:709-732
- Publication Year :
- 2018
- Publisher :
- Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2018.
-
Abstract
- Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue for Evidential Uniqueness, the claim that for every batch of evidence, there’s a unique doxastic state that it’s permissible for subjects with that total evidence to have. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to assess these deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. I’ll show that these arguments only work given a particular kind of deference principle, and I’ll argue that there are reasons to reject these kinds of principles. The second aim of this paper is to spell out what a plausible generalized deference principle looks like. I’ll start by offering a principled rationale for taking deference to constrain rational belief. Then I’ll flesh out the kind of deference principle suggested by this rationale. Finally, I’ll show that this principle is both more plausible and more general than the principles used in the deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness.
- Subjects :
- Philosophy of mind
05 social sciences
Deference
Doxastic logic
Spell
Metaphysics
06 humanities and the arts
0603 philosophy, ethics and religion
Rational belief
050105 experimental psychology
Epistemology
Philosophy of language
Philosophy
060302 philosophy
0501 psychology and cognitive sciences
Sociology
Uniqueness
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 15730883 and 00318116
- Volume :
- 176
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........675784e8063a3f7daf81bd7148bc23c9