Cyber-Enabled Warfare and Deterrence: The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox of U.S. Doctrine and Technologies

Over the past decade, the United States has compellingly demonstrated that states who are able to harness cyber capabilities to coordinate efforts across air, sea, land, and space domains can exercise highly effective coercive and deterrent threats. However, the US’ increasing reliance on cyber to enhance networked combat makes the US not only more lethal, but also potentially more vulnerable. How does this impact deterrence and crisis stability? This paper explores the role that cyber plays in the dynamics of conventional deterrence and argues that the true impact of cyber on deterrence is not cyber as a weapons system, but instead cyber as an enabler of offensive military operations. As the US continues to invest in cyber-dependent technologies and strategies like unmanned aerial platforms, precision weapons, and network-reliant joint planning, it can conduct strikes further away from the battlefield and with greater effectiveness. It also means, however, that the US will not be able to execute its planned operations if cyber key terrain, like satellite relay nodes, intelligence infrastructure, or GPS communication links are attacked by cross-domain weaponry. This paradox of capability and vulnerability makes cyber-enabled warfare a dangerous dependency for three reasons. First, states that are cyber-dependent and highly capable may perceive a first mover advantage to strike before their network capabilities are degraded. Secondly, a less capable cyber state may also see a first mover advantage in attacking the more capable/more cyber-dependent state before the cyber-dependent state is able to conduct a cyber-enabled highly effective, long range “blinding” attack. Finally, because the weapons and operations that cyber enables are increasingly long range, with little indications and warning, and with few defenses once employed, cyber has created at least a perception of offensive advantage. These findings indicate that cyber may both bolster deterrence and incentivize attack in a difficult paradox of capability and vulnerability.