Heidegger on Hegel on Time

In Being and Time Heidegger gives preference to Hegel’s ontology of time over earlier conceptions of time (including Aristotle’s and Kant’s), on account of his insight that time is in some sense neither subjective nor objective. However, he objects to Hegel’s method of unfolding the concept of time, which according to him relapses into a “vulgar” conception of presence as an empty point. Heidegger confuses Hegel’s method with an object-level claim about the ontology of time and, therefore, misses—among other things—the crucial Hegelian insight from the philosophy of nature and subjective spirit that time has to be embodied by thinkers. Historical time is not an automated, ontotheological process of absolute spirit’s self-revelation, but rather a conception of the human being as free agent.