Modeling green supply chain games with governmental interventions and risk preferences under fuzzy uncertainties

The aggravation of environmental issues makes green manufacturing become inevitable and fuzzy uncertainties prevail in supply chain management. To further promote the development of green supply chain, this paper considers a two-echelon green supply chain models with governmental interventions composed of one supplier and one retailer under fuzzy uncertainties, in which the parameters of demand function and manufacturing cost are all characterized as fuzzy variables. Then the equilibrium decisions of the expected value and chance-constrained programming models are derived considering the different risk references of the supplier and the retailer. At the end, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the theoretical underpinning of proposed models. Analytical results indicate that the supplier and the retailer can obtain different equilibrium decisions by adjusting different confidence levels. The equilibrium decisions reflect the risk attitudes of the supplier and the retailer to the uncertainties in supply chain system and their different predictions on possible level. Then, whether the supplier as a leader has the first-mover advantage is related to the risk attitudes of the supplier and the retailer when dealing with the uncertainties of the green supply chain system. Moreover, the strong governmental interventions can coordinate not only the conflict between pricing and green level decisions, but also the contradiction between the consumers and the supplier. In addition, the retailer may be the main puller of the green supply chain in developing the green product.