When skeptical, stick with the norm: Low dilemma plausibility increases deontological moral judgments

In moral psychology, typically used dilemmas contrast options where deontology and utilitarianism demand mutually exclusive actions. However, these dilemmas are usually unrealistic thought experiments, with implausibly few options and implausible statements about the consequences of these options. The present research examines whether variations in dilemma plausibility influence moral judgments. This influence might result from two psychological factors—cost–benefit calculations and reactance-type processes. Both can be predicted to cause more deontological judgments for implausible compared to plausible moral dilemmas. In two experiments (total N = 417), dilemmas were modified to create a plausible and an implausible version without altering the actions and their alleged consequences. We observed that low (compared to high) plausibility within dilemmas increased deontological judgments. Consequently, varying plausibility constitutes a potential confound when examining moral cognition by comparing different dilemma versions. We suggest using only plausible dilemmas to examine moral judgments.